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Fix compilation without implicit nlohmann conversions

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This commit is contained in:
Nicolas Werner 2022-06-17 03:11:31 +02:00
parent 28acea55e2
commit ef941920ea
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GPG key ID: C8D75E610773F2D9
10 changed files with 86 additions and 71 deletions
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8
src/encryption/DeviceVerificationFlow.cpp
View file

@ -270,7 +270,8 @@ DeviceVerificationFlow::DeviceVerificationFlow(QObject *,
json j = their_keys.master_keys;
j.erase("signatures");
j.erase("unsigned");
mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key = j;
mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key =
j.get<mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys>();
master_key.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
["ed25519:" + http::client()->device_id()] =
olm::client()->sign_message(j.dump());
@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ DeviceVerificationFlow::DeviceVerificationFlow(QObject *,
continue;
auto ssk = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(*secret);
mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys dev = j;
mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys dev = j.get<mtx::crypto::DeviceKeys>();
dev.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
["ed25519:" + ssk.public_key()] = ssk.sign(j.dump());
@ -314,7 +315,8 @@ DeviceVerificationFlow::DeviceVerificationFlow(QObject *,
continue;
auto usk = mtx::crypto::PkSigning::from_seed(*secret);
mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key = j;
mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys master_key =
j.get<mtx::crypto::CrossSigningKeys>();
master_key.signatures[utils::localUser().toStdString()]
["ed25519:" + usk.public_key()] = usk.sign(j.dump());

21
src/encryption/Olm.cpp
View file

@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ from_json(const nlohmann::json &obj, OlmMessage &msg)
if (obj.at("content").at("algorithm") != OLM_ALGO)
throw std::invalid_argument("invalid algorithm for olm message");
msg.sender = obj.at("sender");
msg.sender_key = obj.at("content").at("sender_key");
msg.sender = obj.at("sender").get<std::string>();
msg.sender_key = obj.at("content").at("sender_key").get<std::string>();
msg.ciphertext = obj.at("content")
.at("ciphertext")
.get<std::map<std::string, mtx::events::msg::OlmCipherContent>>();
@ -122,11 +122,11 @@ handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEven
continue;
}
std::string msg_type = j_msg.at("type");
std::string msg_type = j_msg.at("type").get<std::string>();
if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomEncrypted)) {
try {
olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg;
olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg.get<olm::OlmMessage>();
cache::client()->query_keys(
olm_msg.sender, [olm_msg](const UserKeyCache &userKeys, mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
if (e) {
@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEven
} else if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomKeyRequest)) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("handling key request event: {}", j_msg.dump(2));
try {
mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> req = j_msg;
mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest> req =
j_msg.get<mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyRequest>>();
if (req.content.action == mtx::events::msg::RequestAction::Request)
handle_key_request_message(req);
else
@ -246,14 +247,14 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKey
// claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. sender must correspond
// to the user who sent the event, recipient to the local user, and
// recipient_keys to the local ed25519 key.
std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"];
std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"].get<std::string>();
if (receiver_ed25519.empty() ||
receiver_ed25519 != olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include our ed25519: {}",
payload.dump());
return;
}
std::string receiver = payload["recipient"];
std::string receiver = payload["recipient"].get<std::string>();
if (receiver.empty() || receiver != http::client()->user_id().to_string()) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include our user_id: {}",
payload.dump());
@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKey
// this check, a client cannot be sure that the sender device owns the
// private part of the ed25519 key it claims to have in the Olm payload.
// This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds to a verified device.
std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"];
std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"].get<std::string>();
if (sender_ed25519.empty()) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event doesn't include sender ed25519: {}",
payload.dump());
@ -294,7 +295,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKey
}
{
std::string msg_type = payload["type"];
std::string msg_type = payload["type"].get<std::string>();
json event_array = json::array();
event_array.push_back(payload);
@ -1334,7 +1335,7 @@ send_encrypted_to_device_messages(const std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::s
continue;
}
auto otk = rd.second.begin()->at("key");
auto otk = rd.second.begin()->at("key").get<std::string>();
auto sign_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).ed25519;
auto id_key = pks.at(user_id).at(device_id).curve25519;