Merge master and fix conflicts

This commit is contained in:
Joe 2021-07-24 18:26:25 -04:00
commit 3f567a8da7
87 changed files with 5667 additions and 2989 deletions

View file

@ -123,7 +123,17 @@ handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEven
if (msg_type == to_string(mtx::events::EventType::RoomEncrypted)) {
try {
olm::OlmMessage olm_msg = j_msg;
handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg));
cache::client()->query_keys(
olm_msg.sender,
[olm_msg](const UserKeyCache &userKeys, mtx::http::RequestErr e) {
if (e) {
nhlog::crypto()->error(
"Failed to query user keys, dropping olm "
"message");
return;
}
handle_olm_message(std::move(olm_msg), userKeys);
});
} catch (const nlohmann::json::exception &e) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
"parsing error for olm message: {} {}", e.what(), j_msg.dump(2));
@ -197,13 +207,15 @@ handle_to_device_messages(const std::vector<mtx::events::collections::DeviceEven
}
void
handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg, const UserKeyCache &otherUserDeviceKeys)
{
nhlog::crypto()->info("sender : {}", msg.sender);
nhlog::crypto()->info("sender_key: {}", msg.sender_key);
const auto my_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
bool failed_decryption = false;
for (const auto &cipher : msg.ciphertext) {
// We skip messages not meant for the current device.
if (cipher.first != my_key) {
@ -224,6 +236,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
msg.sender, msg.sender_key, cipher.second);
} else {
nhlog::crypto()->error("Undecryptable olm message!");
failed_decryption = true;
continue;
}
}
@ -231,6 +244,57 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
if (!payload.is_null()) {
mtx::events::collections::DeviceEvents device_event;
// Other properties are included in order to prevent an attacker from
// publishing someone else's curve25519 keys as their own and subsequently
// claiming to have sent messages which they didn't. sender must correspond
// to the user who sent the event, recipient to the local user, and
// recipient_keys to the local ed25519 key.
std::string receiver_ed25519 = payload["recipient_keys"]["ed25519"];
if (receiver_ed25519.empty() ||
receiver_ed25519 != olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
"Decrypted event doesn't include our ed25519: {}",
payload.dump());
return;
}
std::string receiver = payload["recipient"];
if (receiver.empty() || receiver != http::client()->user_id().to_string()) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
"Decrypted event doesn't include our user_id: {}",
payload.dump());
return;
}
// Clients must confirm that the sender_key and the ed25519 field value
// under the keys property match the keys returned by /keys/query for the
// given user, and must also verify the signature of the payload. Without
// this check, a client cannot be sure that the sender device owns the
// private part of the ed25519 key it claims to have in the Olm payload.
// This is crucial when the ed25519 key corresponds to a verified device.
std::string sender_ed25519 = payload["keys"]["ed25519"];
if (sender_ed25519.empty()) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn(
"Decrypted event doesn't include sender ed25519: {}",
payload.dump());
return;
}
bool from_their_device = false;
for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key) {
if (key.keys.at("ed25519:" + device_id) == sender_ed25519) {
from_their_device = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!from_their_device) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted event isn't sent from a device "
"listed by that user! {}",
payload.dump());
return;
}
{
std::string msg_type = payload["type"];
json event_array = json::array();
@ -242,7 +306,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
if (temp_events.empty()) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("Decrypted unknown event: {}",
payload.dump());
continue;
return;
}
device_event = temp_events.at(0);
}
@ -276,17 +340,20 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
ChatPage::instance()->receivedDeviceVerificationDone(e8->content);
} else if (auto roomKey =
std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::RoomKey>>(&device_event)) {
create_inbound_megolm_session(*roomKey, msg.sender_key);
create_inbound_megolm_session(
*roomKey, msg.sender_key, sender_ed25519);
} else if (auto forwardedRoomKey =
std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::ForwardedRoomKey>>(
&device_event)) {
forwardedRoomKey->content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain.push_back(
msg.sender_key);
import_inbound_megolm_session(*forwardedRoomKey);
} else if (auto e =
std::get_if<DeviceEvent<msg::SecretSend>>(&device_event)) {
auto local_user = http::client()->user_id();
if (msg.sender != local_user.to_string())
continue;
return;
auto secret_name =
request_id_to_secret_name.find(e->content.request_id);
@ -306,7 +373,7 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
cache::verificationStatus(local_user.to_string());
if (!verificationStatus)
continue;
return;
auto deviceKeys = cache::userKeys(local_user.to_string());
std::string sender_device_id;
@ -344,7 +411,6 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
"for secrect "
"'{}'",
name);
return;
}
});
@ -360,27 +426,28 @@ handle_olm_message(const OlmMessage &msg)
}
return;
} else {
failed_decryption = true;
}
}
try {
auto otherUserDeviceKeys = cache::userKeys(msg.sender);
if (failed_decryption) {
try {
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys.device_keys) {
if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key)
targets[msg.sender].push_back(device_id);
}
if (!otherUserDeviceKeys)
return;
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
for (auto [device_id, key] : otherUserDeviceKeys->device_keys) {
if (key.keys.at("curve25519:" + device_id) == msg.sender_key)
targets[msg.sender].push_back(device_id);
send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
targets, mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::Dummy>{}, true);
nhlog::crypto()->info("Recovering from broken olm channel with {}:{}",
msg.sender,
msg.sender_key);
} catch (std::exception &e) {
nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to recover from broken olm sessions: {}",
e.what());
}
send_encrypted_to_device_messages(
targets, mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::Dummy>{}, true);
nhlog::crypto()->info(
"Recovering from broken olm channel with {}:{}", msg.sender, msg.sender_key);
} catch (std::exception &e) {
nhlog::crypto()->error("Failed to recover from broken olm sessions: {}", e.what());
}
}
@ -450,7 +517,7 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id,
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> sendSessionTo;
mtx::crypto::OutboundGroupSessionPtr session = nullptr;
OutboundGroupSessionData group_session_data;
GroupSessionData group_session_data;
if (cache::outboundMegolmSessionExists(room_id)) {
auto res = cache::getOutboundMegolmSession(room_id);
@ -519,7 +586,8 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id,
} else {
// compare devices
bool device_removed = false;
for (const auto &dev : session_member_it->second.devices) {
for (const auto &dev :
session_member_it->second.deviceids) {
if (!member_it->second ||
!member_it->second->device_keys.count(
dev.first)) {
@ -541,7 +609,7 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id,
if (member_it->second)
for (const auto &dev :
member_it->second->device_keys)
if (!session_member_it->second.devices
if (!session_member_it->second.deviceids
.count(dev.first) &&
(member_it->first != own_user_id ||
dev.first != device_id))
@ -571,32 +639,28 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id,
const auto session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
// Saving the new megolm session.
OutboundGroupSessionData session_data{};
session_data.session_id = mtx::crypto::session_id(session.get());
session_data.session_key = mtx::crypto::session_key(session.get());
session_data.message_index = 0;
session_data.timestamp = QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch();
GroupSessionData session_data{};
session_data.message_index = 0;
session_data.timestamp = QDateTime::currentMSecsSinceEpoch();
session_data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
sendSessionTo.clear();
for (const auto &[user, devices] : members) {
sendSessionTo[user] = {};
session_data.initially.keys[user] = {};
session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
if (devices) {
for (const auto &[device_id_, key] : devices->device_keys) {
(void)key;
if (device_id != device_id_ || user != own_user_id) {
sendSessionTo[user].push_back(device_id_);
session_data.initially.keys[user]
.devices[device_id_] = 0;
session_data.currently.keys[user]
.deviceids[device_id_] = 0;
}
}
}
}
cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session);
group_session_data = std::move(session_data);
{
MegolmSessionIndex index;
index.room_id = room_id;
@ -604,8 +668,12 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id,
index.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
auto megolm_session =
olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(session_key);
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session));
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(
index, std::move(megolm_session), session_data);
}
cache::saveOutboundMegolmSession(room_id, session_data, session);
group_session_data = std::move(session_data);
}
mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> megolm_payload{};
@ -641,8 +709,8 @@ encrypt_group_message(const std::string &room_id, const std::string &device_id,
group_session_data.currently.keys[user] = {};
for (const auto &device_id_ : devices) {
if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].devices.count(device_id_))
group_session_data.currently.keys[user].devices[device_id_] =
if (!group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids.count(device_id_))
group_session_data.currently.keys[user].deviceids[device_id_] =
group_session_data.message_index;
}
}
@ -704,7 +772,8 @@ try_olm_decryption(const std::string &sender_key, const mtx::events::msg::OlmCip
void
create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::RoomKey> &roomKey,
const std::string &sender_key)
const std::string &sender_key,
const std::string &sender_ed25519)
{
MegolmSessionIndex index;
index.room_id = roomKey.content.room_id;
@ -712,9 +781,13 @@ create_inbound_megolm_session(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::R
index.sender_key = sender_key;
try {
GroupSessionData data{};
data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = {sender_key};
data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sender_ed25519;
auto megolm_session =
olm::client()->init_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session));
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
return;
@ -741,7 +814,13 @@ import_inbound_megolm_session(
try {
auto megolm_session =
olm::client()->import_inbound_group_session(roomKey.content.session_key);
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session));
GroupSessionData data{};
data.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain =
roomKey.content.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
data.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = roomKey.content.sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
cache::saveInboundMegolmSession(index, std::move(megolm_session), data);
} catch (const lmdb::error &e) {
nhlog::crypto()->critical("failed to save inbound megolm session: {}", e.what());
return;
@ -817,21 +896,16 @@ handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyR
return;
}
// Check if we were the sender of the session being requested.
if (req.content.sender_key != olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519) {
nhlog::crypto()->debug("ignoring key request {} because we were not the sender: "
"\nrequested({}) ours({})",
req.content.request_id,
req.content.sender_key,
olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519);
return;
}
// Check if we have the keys for the requested session.
auto outboundSession = cache::getOutboundMegolmSession(req.content.room_id);
if (!outboundSession.session) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("requested session not found in room: {}",
req.content.room_id);
// Check if we were the sender of the session being requested (unless it is actually us
// requesting the session).
if (req.sender != http::client()->user_id().to_string() &&
req.content.sender_key != olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519) {
nhlog::crypto()->debug(
"ignoring key request {} because we did not create the requested session: "
"\nrequested({}) ours({})",
req.content.request_id,
req.content.sender_key,
olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519);
return;
}
@ -839,7 +913,15 @@ handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyR
MegolmSessionIndex index{};
index.room_id = req.content.room_id;
index.session_id = req.content.session_id;
index.sender_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().curve25519;
index.sender_key = req.content.sender_key;
// Check if we have the keys for the requested session.
auto sessionData = cache::getMegolmSessionData(index);
if (!sessionData) {
nhlog::crypto()->warn("requested session not found in room: {}",
req.content.room_id);
return;
}
const auto session = cache::getInboundMegolmSession(index);
if (!session) {
@ -873,12 +955,12 @@ handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyR
bool shouldSeeKeys = false;
uint64_t minimumIndex = -1;
if (outboundSession.data.currently.keys.count(req.sender)) {
if (outboundSession.data.currently.keys.at(req.sender)
.devices.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) {
if (sessionData->currently.keys.count(req.sender)) {
if (sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
.deviceids.count(req.content.requesting_device_id)) {
shouldSeeKeys = true;
minimumIndex = outboundSession.data.currently.keys.at(req.sender)
.devices.at(req.content.requesting_device_id);
minimumIndex = sessionData->currently.keys.at(req.sender)
.deviceids.at(req.content.requesting_device_id);
}
}
@ -906,8 +988,9 @@ handle_key_request_message(const mtx::events::DeviceEvent<mtx::events::msg::KeyR
forward_key.sender_key = index.sender_key;
// TODO(Nico): Figure out if this is correct
forward_key.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = olm::client()->identity_keys().ed25519;
forward_key.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain = {};
forward_key.sender_claimed_ed25519_key = sessionData->sender_claimed_ed25519_key;
forward_key.forwarding_curve25519_key_chain =
sessionData->forwarding_curve25519_key_chain;
send_megolm_key_to_device(
req.sender, req.content.requesting_device_id, forward_key);
@ -928,6 +1011,7 @@ send_megolm_key_to_device(const std::string &user_id,
std::map<std::string, std::vector<std::string>> targets;
targets[user_id] = {device_id};
send_encrypted_to_device_messages(targets, room_key);
nhlog::crypto()->debug("Forwarded key to {}:{}", user_id, device_id);
}
DecryptionResult