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proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s)

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* HTTPS proxies:

An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection.
Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent
uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct
the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin
server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy
communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests
(including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text.

With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_
SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy
and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server
(through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions
as well.

A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL
options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO):

  --proxy-cacert FILE        CA certificate to verify peer against
  --proxy-capath DIR         CA directory to verify peer against
  --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password
  --proxy-cert-type TYPE     Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
  --proxy-ciphers LIST       SSL ciphers to use
  --proxy-crlfile FILE       Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file
  --proxy-insecure           Allow connections to proxies with bad certs
  --proxy-key KEY            Private key file name
  --proxy-key-type TYPE      Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
  --proxy-pass PASS          Pass phrase for the private key
  --proxy-ssl-allow-beast    Allow security flaw to improve interop
  --proxy-sslv2              Use SSLv2
  --proxy-sslv3              Use SSLv3
  --proxy-tlsv1              Use TLSv1
  --proxy-tlsuser USER       TLS username
  --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password
  --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP)

All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts,
except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath
which defaults to --capath.

Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable,
similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable.

Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS.

* A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination:

If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to
the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS
proxy.

TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options.
Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
This commit is contained in:
Alex Rousskov 2016-11-16 10:49:15 -07:00 • committed by Daniel Stenberg
parent 8034d8fc62
commit cb4e2be7c6
76 changed files with 3413 additions and 962 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

69
lib/vtls/axtls.c
View file

@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* axTLS only supports TLSv1 */
/* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
switch(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version)) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
break;
@ -183,17 +183,17 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl = NULL;
/* Load the trusted CA cert bundle file */
if(data->set.ssl.CAfile) {
if(ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, SSL_OBJ_X509_CACERT, data->set.ssl.CAfile, NULL)
!= SSL_OK) {
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile)) {
if(ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, SSL_OBJ_X509_CACERT,
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile), NULL) != SSL_OK) {
infof(data, "error reading ca cert file %s \n",
data->set.ssl.CAfile);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile));
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
else
infof(data, "found certificates in %s\n", data->set.ssl.CAfile);
infof(data, "found certificates in %s\n", SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile));
}
/* gtls.c tasks we're skipping for now:
@ -205,15 +205,15 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
*/
/* Load client certificate */
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert)) {
i=0;
/* Instead of trying to analyze cert type here, let axTLS try them all. */
while(cert_types[i] != 0) {
ssl_fcn_return = ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, cert_types[i],
data->set.str[STRING_CERT], NULL);
SSL_SET_OPTION(cert), NULL);
if(ssl_fcn_return == SSL_OK) {
infof(data, "successfully read cert file %s \n",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
SSL_SET_OPTION(cert));
break;
}
i++;
@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* Tried all cert types, none worked. */
if(cert_types[i] == 0) {
failf(data, "%s is not x509 or pkcs12 format",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
SSL_SET_OPTION(cert));
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
@ -229,15 +229,15 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* Load client key.
If a pkcs12 file successfully loaded a cert, then there's nothing to do
because the key has already been loaded. */
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY] && cert_types[i] != SSL_OBJ_PKCS12) {
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(key) && cert_types[i] != SSL_OBJ_PKCS12) {
i=0;
/* Instead of trying to analyze key type here, let axTLS try them all. */
while(key_types[i] != 0) {
ssl_fcn_return = ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, key_types[i],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY], NULL);
SSL_SET_OPTION(key), NULL);
if(ssl_fcn_return == SSL_OK) {
infof(data, "successfully read key file %s \n",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
SSL_SET_OPTION(key));
break;
}
i++;
@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* Tried all key types, none worked. */
if(key_types[i] == 0) {
failf(data, "Failure: %s is not a supported key file",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
SSL_SET_OPTION(key));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
@ -256,13 +256,14 @@ static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
* 2) setting up callbacks. these seem gnutls specific
*/
if(conn->ssl_config.sessionid) {
if(data->set.general_ssl.sessionid) {
const uint8_t *ssl_sessionid;
size_t ssl_idsize;
/* In axTLS, handshaking happens inside ssl_client_new. */
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, (void **) &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize)) {
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, (void **) &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize,
sockindex)) {
/* we got a session id, use it! */
infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
ssl = ssl_client_new(ssl_ctx, conn->sock[sockindex],
@ -291,13 +292,17 @@ static CURLcode connect_finish(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
const char *dns_altname;
int8_t found_subject_alt_names = 0;
int8_t found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn = 0;
const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
conn->host.name;
const char * const dispname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
conn->http_proxy.host.dispname : conn->host.dispname;
/* Here, gtls.c gets the peer certificates and fails out depending on
* settings in "data." axTLS api doesn't have get cert chain fcn, so omit?
*/
/* Verify server's certificate */
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
if(ssl_verify_cert(ssl) != SSL_OK) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "server cert verify failed");
@ -328,8 +333,8 @@ static CURLcode connect_finish(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
found_subject_alt_names = 1;
infof(data, "\tComparing subject alt name DNS with hostname: %s <-> %s\n",
dns_altname, conn->host.name);
if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(dns_altname, conn->host.name)) {
dns_altname, hostname);
if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(dns_altname, hostname)) {
found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn = 1;
break;
}
@ -337,23 +342,21 @@ static CURLcode connect_finish(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
/* RFC2818 checks */
if(found_subject_alt_names && !found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
/* Break connection ! */
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n",
conn->host.dispname);
failf(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n", dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n",
conn->host.dispname);
infof(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n", dispname);
}
else if(found_subject_alt_names == 0) {
/* Per RFC2818, when no Subject Alt Names were available, examine the peer
CN as a legacy fallback */
peer_CN = ssl_get_cert_dn(ssl, SSL_X509_CERT_COMMON_NAME);
if(peer_CN == NULL) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
@ -362,17 +365,17 @@ static CURLcode connect_finish(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
infof(data, "unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
}
else {
if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, hostname)) {
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
/* Break connection ! */
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "\tcommon name \"%s\" does not match \"%s\"\n",
peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
peer_CN, dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\tcommon name \"%s\" does not match \"%s\"\n",
peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
peer_CN, dispname);
}
}
}
@ -383,12 +386,12 @@ static CURLcode connect_finish(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
conn->send[sockindex] = axtls_send;
/* Put our freshly minted SSL session in cache */
if(conn->ssl_config.sessionid) {
if(data->set.general_ssl.sessionid) {
const uint8_t *ssl_sessionid = ssl_get_session_id_size(ssl);
size_t ssl_idsize = ssl_get_session_id(ssl);
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(conn);
if(Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, (void *) ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize)
!= CURLE_OK)
if(Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, (void *) ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize,
sockindex) != CURLE_OK)
infof (data, "failed to add session to cache\n");
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(conn);
}